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Abstract— IPsec is a powerful mechanism for protecting net-
work communications. However, it is often viewed as difficult
to use due to the elaborate configuration that is needed to
ensure correct (and secure) operation. In this paper, we seek to
answer the question of how to build IPsec VPNs without affecting
the network assets. We exploit “repeater-encryption”, which is
similar to the IPsec bump-in-the-wire mode of operation. Our
IPsec encryption unit works at Layer-2 of the network stack
and does not encrypt control packets that are used for routing,
address resolution and resource reservation. Although this is
fairly straightforward for IPv4 networks, IPv6 introduces several
new features and messages that complicate the operation of such
a box. We report our findings of implementing transparent,
repeater-based IPsec protection for IPv4 and IPv6. Our approach
requires no configuration changes to other devices in the network,
making it an attractive mechanism for security network traffic.
We discuss the features of our IPsec encryption unit and show
how it adapts to IPv4 and IPv6 networks. We also implement
our approach on the OpenBSD IPsec stack to demonstrate its
feasibility. We show that our transparent IPsec box can easily
support speeds in excess of 100Mbps.
I. INTRODUCTION
As a result of the widespread use of the Internet for
sensitive as well as everyday tasks, security threats such as
data modification and eavesdropping have become a major
concern. The IPv6 security architecture itself requires IPv6
nodes to implement the IPsec protocol suite, which provides
prevention against some of these threats. However, IPsec may
be unwelcome for administrators of enterprise networks be-
cause they cannot watch a user’s behavior when data leave the
user terminal encrypted; such administrators may be required
by law (e.g., SEC regulations in the United States) to archive
all such traffic for an extended period of time. On the other
hand, configuring all nodes of a large enterprise network to
use IPsec correctly (and securely) can be a difficult and time-
consuming task. One solution for both types of environments
is to use a separate IPsec encryption unit under the control of
the administrator, to protect traffic of other network elements.
Keromytis, Ioannidis and Smith implemented the IPsec
protocol suite for the Linux, OpenBSD and NetBSD [1],
focusing on the implementation and its performance on regular
hosts and routers. Their system box works on layer-3 of the
network stack, as is common for many modern firewall and
VPN units. However, IPsec units that work on Layer-3 have
some disadvantages when placed into existing networks. One
is that routers connect networks which have different network
address, so address reconfiguration is sometimes necessary.
The other is that routers do not transfer packets that have IPv6
link local address. For instance, consider a number of hosts
in the same IPv6 network. They can communicate with other
hosts on the same link using IPv6 link-local addresses. If we
use IPsec units (that work at layer-3 of the network stack)
between hosts to build IPsec VPNs on the same network, we
would require IPv6 global address or IPv6 site local address to
communicate with other hosts beyond the IPsec units. Address
reconfiguration is necessary because IPv6 global address and
IPv6 site-local address are not configured automatically.
Keromytis and Wright extend the previous work and pro-
pose the IPsec bridge [2]. Their bridge encapsulates Ethernet
frames inside IPsec packets. Address reconfiguration is not
necessary because the bridge works in Layer-2. However,
if routers are in the network between the bridges, routers
cannot recognize control packets, because all frames (includ-
ing control packets) are encapsulated. Routers cannot receive
IPv6 control packets such as Neighbor Discovery and Listen
Discovery sent by nodes behind the IPsec bridge. This affects
routing and the creation of multicast groups in IPv6. The
bridge also encrypts Neighbor Advertisement messages. After
it decrypts the message, the Hop limit in the IPv6 header
is decremented. IPv6 nodes which receive the message drop
it because RFC2463 [3] specifies that the Hop limit in the
Neighbor Advertise message should be 255, causing address
resolution problems in IPv6 networks.
Prevelakis and Keromytis propose portable computing ele-
ments [4]. They focus on the system architecture, operation
and reliability. Their system works at Layer-2 and can be
inserted between the mobile workstation and the network. It
works as a firewall and an IPsec gateway to provide individu-
alized security. However, they investigated their system in the
context of IPv4 networks. We show that such a device needs
to be more careful about which IPv6 packets it protects with
IPsec and which must be simply forwarded through.
To use a transparent IPsec device without affecting the
functionality of other network nodes in an IPv6 environment,
we propose a repeater encryption unit. It works at Layer-
2 and does not encrypt IPv6 control packets that are used
for exchanging routing information, address resolution and
resource reservation in IPv4 and IPv6 networks. This makes
it transparent to networks and allows secure communication
without changes of host or router configuration or installation
of software to existing nodes. To confirm the feasibility of
our approach and measure its impact on end-to-end network
communications (which could be significant, given the use
of high-grade cryptography), we implemented our repeater-
encryption unit and measured its impact in some simple
performance experiments.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: in Section
2 we describe our generic repeater architecture. We study its
adaptation to IPv4 and IPv6 networks in Section 3. Section
4 provides some preliminary performance results using our
prototype implementation, and Section 5 concludes the paper.
II. REPEATER ARCHITECTURE
We will elaborate on the architecture and show the software
module configuration and the packet processing flow.
A. S/W module configuration
Fig.1 shows the S/W module configuration. The Ethernet
driver controls two Ethernet ports. We define one port, which
connects with the lower network, as the ”plain port” and
the other port, which connects to the upper network, as the
”cipher port”. Generally, packets that are received through the
plain port are encrypted (and forwarded through the cipher
port) and packets which are received through the cipher
port are decrypted (and forwarded through the plain port).
The Repeater passes the packet to IPsec and the IPv4 or
IPv6 protocol suite. TCP/UDP provides the layer-4 functions.
Applications such as IKE use the regular socket API. The
repeater runs a commodity OS such as OpenBSD or Linux (in
our implementation we use the former, due to our familiarity
with it).
Fig. 1. the S/W module configuration
B. Address configuration
To communicate with other nodes, the encryption unit needs
a few addresses. The encryption unit has a MAC address, an
IPv4 address and three types of IPv6 address for the two
Ethernet ports. The IPv4 address is configured manually or
automatically with DHCP. We do not focus on the details
because it is a traditional way for nodes supporting the IPv4
protocol suite. In this section, we will mainly describe IPv6
addresses.
A link-local address is configured based on the MAC
address. The FP (Format Prefix) of the link local address is
defined as the bit-string 1111 1110 10. The link-local address
is used for communication with nodes on the same link. In
the absence of routers, nodes can communicate with other
terminals on the local network using only link-local addresses.
The link-local address is also necessary for the Neighbor
Discovery Protocol. The link-local address is configured when
the encryption unit does not have any other unicast addresses.
Routers do not forward packets with link local addresses
beyond the local network segment.
The FP of the site-local address is 1111 110 11. The
site-local address is equivalent to private addresses for IPv4.
Because routers do not transfer the packets which have the
site-local address, the site-local address is not reachable from
outside networks. The site-local address is not configured
automatically. Administrators have to allocate the site-local
address manually.
A global unicast address is equivalent to the public IPv4
address. The global routing prefix is provided by the router,
ISP or the network administrators assigning the global routing
prefix.
C. Overview of the packet processing flow
In this section we describe how our encryption unit works.
Fig.2 shows the packet flow when the encryption unit receives
the packet through the plain port. Fig.3 also shows the packet
flow when the encryption unit receives the packet through the
cipher port.
Fig. 2. the packet flow from the plain port to the cipher port
The Repeater is located between the Ethernet driver and
the Local I/F and works at the data link layer. The Ethernet
driver receives all frames and passes them to the Repeater. The
Repeater checks the destination MAC address of the frames.
If it is a broadcast or a local frame, which means frames to the
encryption unit itself, it is passed to the Local I/F. Then, the
frames whose type is 0x0800 are passed to IPv4 and the frames
whose type is 0x86DD are passed to IPv6. Those frames are
for the layer-3, the layer-4 or applications in the encryption
unit and are not forwarded. Broadcast and multicast frames are
copied and are passed from the Repeater to the IPsec module.
Non-local frames are also passed to the IPsec module. At the
IPsec module the payload of the IP packet is encrypted. This
is called ”bump in the wire” (BITW) in the IPsec architecture.
In order to get the link layer address of the destination IPsec
module looks up the ARP cache for IPv4 or the Neighbor
cache for IPv6. Then, the encrypted packet is sent from the
cipher Ethernet port.
Fig. 3. the packet flow from the cipher port to the plain port
The Ethernet driver on the cipher port also receives all
frames and passes them to the Repeater. The Repeater checks
the destination MAC address of the frames. If it is a non-
local frame, it is passed to the IPsec module. Broadcast and
multicast frames are copied and are passed to the Local I/F
and sent from the plain port. The local frames except IPsec
packets are also passed to the Local I/F. The local frames
which contain IPsec packets are passed to the IPsec module
to decrypt them. After decryption, packets whose destination
IP address is local or broadcast are passed to the Local
I/F through the Repeater. Those packets are for encrypted
communication for the layer-3, the layer-4 or applications in
the encryption unit. The broadcast packets are copied and sent
from the plain port. Packets whose destination IP address is
non-local are also sent from the plain port. We discuss each
module in the next section.
D. The Ethernet driver
The Ethernet driver operates at the physical and data
link layer. It controls the LAN controller, for example Intel
IXF1104 and FCC in Motorola MPC8255, and makes it
receive all frames and send the frames from the Repeater
and the IPsec module. If an error occurs during reception or
transmission, the Ethernet driver discards the frame. In the
IPsec module, data is added to the original packet and put
away from the packet. For instance, during encryption the
new IP header, the ESP header and trailer are added to the
packet; during decryption they are removed from the packet.
To avoid the copy of the data, the LAN controller, which is
able to transmit packets that consist of several parts of data
located in non-contiguous areas in memory, has a performance
advantage.
E. The Repeater
The Repeater checks the destination MAC address of the
frame and the port at which the encryption units receives
and then determines the procedure. The Repeater passes local
frames from the plain port to the Local I/F. It passes non-local
frames from the plain port to IPsec. If frames are broadcast or
multicast, the Repeater copies the frame and passes the source
of the frame to the Local I/F and the copied frame to IPsec.
On the other hand, the Repeater passes local frames ,which are
not IPsec, from the cipher port to the Local I/F. The Repeater
passes local frames which are IPsec to IPsec. Non-local frames
are passed to IPsec. Broadcast and multicast frames are copied
and then the source of the frame is passed to the Local I/F
and the copied frame is passed to IPsec.
III. ADAPTATION TO IPV4 AND IPV6 NETWORKS
We now describe the use of the repeater in IPv4 and IPv6
networks, and in particular how control packets and protocols
of various types are handled so as to ensure correct operation
of the network.
A. Handling of IPv4 control packets
In order not to affect regular communications, we must be
careful in handling of control packets. These are the protocols
that the encryption units do not encrypt in IPv4.
[ARP] IPv4 nodes send ARP frames to resolve link layer
addresses on the same link. The encryption units must not
encrypt the ARP flames because the nodes might not be able
to get the link layer addresses. Both non-local frames and
broadcast frames are not encrypted.
[ICMPv4] ICMPv4 provides the error and the control infor-
mation. The ICMPv4 packets have part of the data that caused
the error. To protect the part of the data the encryption unit
encrypts the ICMPv4 packets, such as Destination unreach-
able, TTL exceed and Parameter problem etc, if they match
the SPD. But the Redirection message is an exception. The
Redirect message is send from routers to inform about a better
next hop address to reach a destination. In order not to affect
routing functions in the network, the Redirect messages should
not be encrypted.
[Routing] Routers exchange the routing information with
protocols such RIPv4 and OSPFv4. There might be routers
between encryption units. If the encryption unit encrypts the
routing packets, the encrypted routing information would not
be understandable to routers. The routing protocol should not
be encrypted at the encryption unit in order not to affect
routing functions in the networks.
[RSVPv4] Nodes send the RSVPv4 message to make a
reservation for the resources in the network. The encrypted
RSVPv4 message would not also be understandable to nodes
between encryption units. To make a reservation between end-
end communications, the RSVPv4 should not be encrypted at
the encryption units.
[IKE] Nodes which support IPsec send IKE packets to es-
tablish SAs. The encryption unit does not encrypt the IKE
packets, which are sent by other nodes, not to interrupt the
establishment of the SA through the encryption units.
B. Handling of IPv6 control packets
We now discuss the handling of the IPv6 control packets.
So as not to affect the proper operation of the networks the
units are installed in, the handling of control packets is more
involved than in IPv4. The following protocols in IPv6 should
not be encrypted at the encryption units.
[ICMPv6] ICMPv6 provides the error information (Destina-
tion unreachable, Packet too big, Time exceeded, parameter
problem), the functions such as Echo, Neighbor Discovery
and Listen Discovery. The ICMPv6 packets which contain
error information have a part of the data that caused the error.
To protect the part of the data the encryption unit encrypts
the ICMPv6 packets, such as Destination unreachable, TTL
exceed and Parameter problem etc, if they match the SPD.
But the Redirection, the Neighbor Discovery and the Multi-
cast listener Discovery message are exceptions. The Redirect
message should not be encrypted. This is the same reason
as the ICMPv4 redirection is not encrypted. The Neighbor
Discovery and the Multicast Listener Discovery message are
sent for interaction between nodes. In order not to affect the
interaction, they should not be encrypted. We will show the
handling of their messages later.
[Routing] Routers also exchange routing information with
protocols such as RIPv6 and OSPFv6. RIPv6 and OSPFv6
should not be encrypted, for the same reason that RIPv4 and
OSPFv4 are not encrypted.
[RSVPv6] Nodes also send the RSVPv6 messages to make
a reservation for the resources in the network. The RSVPv6
messages should not be encrypted. This is the same reason as
RSVPv4 is not encrypted.
[IKE] In IPv6 nodes send IKE packets to establish SAs, too.
The encryption unit does not encrypt the IKE packets. This is
the same reason as IKE on IPv4 is not encrypted.
We show the summary of the protocol handling in TableI.
C. Source IP address check
The source IP address of the IPv6 packet is a link-local
address, a site-local address or a global address. Routers check
the source IP address of the packet and do not forward packets
whose source address is a link-local address. Routers also
do not forward packets whose source address is a site-local
address in IPv6 or a private address in IPv4, to the Internet.
To construct the Intranet VPNs in the local network, those
packets should be encrypted and transferred by the encryption























address. The encryption unit is not a router so it can be
possible to encrypt and transfer the packets even though their
source address is a link local address or a site local address.
D. IPsec protocol processing
IPsec checks the SPD for the packet which is not a control
packet. If it matches the SPD, the encryption unit establishes
the SA for the tunnel end point. IPsec stores the packets until
an SA is established. If an SA has already been established,
the packet is encrypted immediately. IPsec processing is based
on RFCs [5],[6],[7].
In the IPsec standard, there are two protocol modes, trans-
port mode and tunnel mode. IPsec hosts have to implement
both modes. IPsec gateways, such as routers and firewalls,
need the tunnel mode. Our encryption unit is a sort of IPsec
gateways so it implements tunnel mode. In tunnel mode,
security is applied to the whole IP packet. These are examples
of tunnel mode. In tunnel mode, ESP or AH protect the entire
inner IP packet including the IP header of the original packet.
The encryption unit provides the IPv6 encapsulation for IPv4
packets and the IPv4 encapsulation for IPv6 packets.
E. IP header construction
This section describes how to construct the new IP header
and how to handle the fields of the original IP header. The IP
source address and destination address in the new IP header
are the endpoint of the tunnel. The original IP address in the
original IP header is not changed. The TTL is not decremented
because the encryption unit is not a router. The IP options or
IP extension headers of the original packet are not changed. In
the IPv6 header construction, the encryption unit should not
decrement the Hop limit.This is the same reason for the TTL
in IPv4. The source address in the new IPv6 header depends
on the destination address, which means the tunnel end point
address. The encryption unit chooses a link local address if the
destination address is a link local address. If the destination
address is a site local address, it chooses a site local address.
It chooses a global address if the destination address is a
global address. When a global address is not configured, a
site local address is available if it is configured. When a site
local address is not configured, a global address is available if
it is configured. When neither a global address nor a site local
address is configured, a link local address should be chosen.
F. Source link layer address replacement
After decryption, the encryption unit sends the plain packet
to the terminal. A MAC header is added to the packet before
sending it. The source address set to the MAC header must
be careful. Usually, the encryption unit uses its MAC address
for the flames which it sends, but the encryption unit should
not use its MAC address for the decrypted packets. This might
affect network devices, such as terminals and routers, because
the source address of the MAC header is not for the source IP
address of the packet. In oder not to affect network devices, the
link layer address for the source IP address in the decrypted
IPv4 or IPv6 header must be set to the source address of the
MAC header. If the network address of the source IP address
is not the same as the encryption unit’s address, the link layer
address of the next hop router is set to the MAC header. By
doing this, the encryption unit conceals itself from the terminal
which receives the decrypted packet.
G. Multicast packet processing
There are some IETF standards for the Multicast cipher
communication [8] [9] [10]. In the RFCs, the key server man-
ages the policy of the cipher communication and distributes
the encryption key to the members of the multicast group.
The key server controls the system so the availability and the
duration of the key server are a big issue. Even through the
RFCs are standardized, the multicast cipher communication
using the key server has not been widely used yet. So the
encryption unit achieves the multicast cipher communication
with the static SA. The policies for the multicast SA are set in
the SPD and the SA is configured manually. An SA is assigned
to ease multicast group. This is an example of the policy:
The destination address of the plain packet: FF08::1
The source address of the plain packet: Terminal1
The Encryption Algorithm: MISTY
The Encryption Key: 08081010 02020909 03030707 04040606
The destination address of the new header: FF08::1
The source address of the new header: the encryption unit
When the encryption unit receives the packet whose des-
tination IP address is multicast, the IPsec module searches
the SPD. If it matches the policy, the packet is encrypted
and forwarded. The encryption unit just sends one encrypted
packet to the members because the encrypted packets have the
multicast address.
H. Path MTU Discovery (PMD)
The packet might be reached through the networks which
have the MTU less than 1500 bytes. Fragmentation might
occur for full size packets. If fragmentation occurs, it is
ineffective for the communication between terminals. The Path
MTU Discovery (PMD) is used to avoid fragmentation.
Fig. 4. fragmentation between T1 and T2
This is an example. In the figure E1 and E2 are the
encryption units. R1 and R2 are routers and then T1 and T2
are terminals. Fragmentation might occur at E1, R1 (means
between E1 and E2), R2 (means between E2 and terminal2).
At the E2, the fragmentation does not occur because the
MTU of the E2 equals one the E1. It is possible to have the
fragmentation between T1 and E1 but it does not matter for
E1 and E2. We describe the behavior of the encryption unit
for a, b, and c.
a) Fragmentation at the IPsec encapsulation: Fragmen-
tation occurs for long size packets after IPsec encapsulation.
The encryption unit sends the Path MTU discovery message
to the sender of the packet (T1). The Path MTU discovery
message contains the correct MTU. T1 changes the MTU and
sends packets which have a suitable packet size. When E1
sends the encrypted packet to E2, E1 stores the information
of the plain packet (such as the source address, the protocol,
port numbers and the identification in the IP header). That
information is used to send PMD to the sender of the packet
if fragmentation occurs for the encrypted packets between E1
and E2. After sending the PMD, the encryption unit keeps the
value of the MTU for every SA to avoid fragmentation. Refer
to b and c.
b) Fragmentation for the encrypted packets: When frag-
mentation occurs between E1 and E2, the PMD message is
sent to the encryption unit (E1). The encryption unit changes
the value of the MTU, which is kept in the encryption unit
(see a). E1 calculates the correct MTU. The correct MTU is
the MTU in the PMD minus the ESP or the AH header size.
E1 has to send the PMD message to T1 to inform about the
correct MTU. The PMD which is sent to E1 has a part of
the encrypted packet that E1 had sent to E2. E1 can not get
the sender of the original plain packet because E1 can not
decrypt the data which has just a part of the encrypted packet.
To specify the sender of the original packet, E1 uses the SPI
and refers the stored information mentioned before and then
sends the PMD to the sender of the original packet (T1).
c) Fragmentation for the decrypted packets: When frag-
mentation occurs for the decrypted packet, the PMD is sent
to the sender of the packet (T1). E2 encrypts the PMD and
sends it to E1. Then, E1 decrypts and transfers it to T1. T1
then sends packets with the correct packet size.
I. Multicast Listener Discovery (MLD)
In IPv6, ICMPv6 is used to discover the multicast listeners.
MLD uses ICMP type 130, 131, and 132 (code 0). The MLD
has three types of message, the Multicast Listener Query, the
Multicast Listener Report and the Multicast Listener Done.
The encryption unit does not encrypt the MLD in order not
to affect the construction of the multicast groups.
Fig. 5. the MLD procedure
J. Neighbor Discovery (ND)
ND provides the interactions between nodes, such as Router
Discovery, Prefix Discovery, Parameter Discovery, Address
configuration, Address resolution, Next hop determination,
Reachability Discovery, Duplicate Address Detection and
Redirect. ND uses ICMP type 133, 134,135,136 and 137. ND
has five types of message, Router Solicitation, Router Adver-
tisement, Neighbor Solicitation, Neighbor Advertisement and
Redirect. Not to interrupt the interactions, the encryption unit
should not encrypt these messages.
Fig. 6. the ND procedure
IV. EVALUATION
To confirm our works, we have implemented the encryp-
tion unit on OpenBSD. Fig.7 is a system for confirmation.
The system has two repeater encryption units between the
server and client. We use IPv6 link local addresses and IPv4
private addresses. All the machines have a Xeon 2.8GHz
processor and 1024MB RAM. They are directly connected
with 1000BaseT. The encryption units have the different
IPsec transforms, ESP DES-SHA1, ESP 3DES-SHA1 and
ESP Blowfish-SHA1. First, we make sure that the server and
the client can communicate with each other over IPv4 and
IPv6 without encryption units. Then, we put the encryption
units into the network. They can communicate with each
other without any reconfiguration and installation of software.
Although they have link local addresses, Their communication
through the encryption unit has no problem. This shows
that we can apply the cipher communication to anywhere in
networks without affecting the network assets.
Next, we measured its performance using netperf[11]. The
client is a netperf client and the server is a netperf server.
The performance can be seen in TableII.We use software
encryptions. They are heavy loads for the CPU but the result
shows that it has enough performance to use it on 100Base-TX
network.
Fig. 7. The system for confirmation
TABLE II
THROUGHPUT THE UDP DATA COMMUNICATION OVER IPSEC
Transform IPv6(Mbps) IPv4(Mbps)
Plain communication 956.06 969.21
ESP DES-SHA1 118.36 132.87
ESP 3DES-SHA1 99.85 105.83
ESP Blowfish-SHA1 136.27 159.10
V. CONCLUSIONS
We have given an overview of the repeater encryption
unit. We also have implemented it on OpenBSD to show the
feasibility of our work. As it works in a layer-2 and does not
encrypt control packets which are used for routing, address
resolution and resource reservation, we can just put the the
encryption unit into the network and build IPsec VPNs in
anywhere in networks without affecting the network assets.
Finally we mentioned the its performance. Although software
encryptions are the burden to the CPU, it can be used on
100Base-TX network. The technology of the semiconductor’s
industry will be rapidly advancing. The higher performance
will be achieved if we use a card with a hardware chip.
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